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Abstract
We show that common short sold capital can explain future six-factor excess return
correlation one month ahead, controlling for many pair characteristics, including simi-
larities in size, book-to-market, and momentum. We explore the possible mechanisms
that could give rise to this relationship. We find that price pressure cannot explain the
uncovered relationship. Rather, the relationship is consistent with informed trading,
which we identify using additional profiling data for short sellers.
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I Introduction
In this paper, we show that common short sold capital provides explanatory power for
the cross-sectional correlation of stock price returns, above and beyond that provided by
classic fundamentals (Huberman, Kandel, and Karolyi, 1988, Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993,
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006), common ownership (Antón and Polk, 2014, Bartram, Griffin,
Lim, and Ng, 2015), and common analyst coverage (Israelsen, 2016).
Using short positions disclosed to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) of the United
Kingdom (UK) between Nov. 2012 and Dec. 2019, we construct a measure of common short
selling. Our measure connects stocks that are shorted by the same entity. We use these
connections to predict (in-sample) the future excess return correlation of equity returns.
Our measure of common short selling predicts excess stock return correlation one month
ahead, controlling for common ownership and common analyst coverage, as well as for sim-
ilarities in size, book-to-market, momentum, and several other common characteristics. In
our most flexible specification, a standard deviation increase in common short sold capital
is associated with a future rise of 2.3% of the average six-factor excess return correlation for
a given stock pair.
Our results show that stocks with high common short sold capital provide less diversifica-
tion benefits than stocks with low or no common short sold capital. In this sense, investors
should consider whether stocks have common short sellers when building their portfolios.
Our approach illustrates how to account for this, using publicly disclosed short selling data.
According to the comovement literature, correlated demand and supply of investors or
common liquidity shocks drive comovement through price pressure (Barberis, Shleifer, and
Wurgler, 2005, Chen, Singal, and Whitelaw, 2016). This could be due to investor choices
to allocate funds to stocks that are similar across different dimensions, such as size, sector,
or index membership (Greenwood, 2007). Alternatively, comovement through price pressure
could be due to different subset of investors trading securities according to specific preferred
habitats. Collectively, we refer to these views as the price pressure mechanism.
For common ownership, this mechanism suggests that, by purchasing and selling stocks
according to investment categories or “habitats”, large institutions induce excess comove-
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ment. A similar mechanism might explain the result we uncover with common short positions—
by short selling (or covering short positions on) stocks according to asset classes, short sellers
induce higher correlation.
To verify whether the price pressure mechanism is a viable explanation of our results, we
exploit the prediction that it prominently occurs when liquidity is scarce (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2005). Specifically, we test whether the uncovered association between common
short sold capital and future correlation is stronger for less liquid stocks.
We do not find sufficient evidence to confirm this is true. In addition to disproving the
price pressure mechanism for common short selling, this result helps shed light on theoretical
studies that argue that short sellers can trigger shifts in correlation (Brunnermeier and
Oehmke, 2014, Cont and Wagalath, 2013). At least for the frequency and periodicity of our
study, our results are not in line with the predictions of these models. Rather, they are
consistent with empirical findings that the price pressure of short sellers is weaker than that
of long sellers (Shkilko, Ness, and Ness, 2012).
Thus, we turn to an alternative explanation for the relationship between common short
selling and excess comovement, based on informed trading by short sellers.
Previous studies have shown that short sellers are sophisticated market agents, who trade
on the basis of superior information and are able to predict future stock price movements
(Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008, Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009, Boehmer, Duong, and
Huszaár, 2018). By shorting several stocks, short sellers expect future price declines. As
declines occur, they should coincide with higher correlation between the shorted stocks.
We verify this view by identifying the short sellers in our sample and classifying them
according to several traits. We find that the effect of common short selling is most predictive
of future excess correlation when it originates from informed agents, such as hedge funds and
active investors, with high turnover and low concentration.
In a similar spirit to Jiao, Massa, and Zhang (2016), by combining long and short posi-
tions of investors, we are able to reveal aspects that could not be studied with just one side
of the data. Our results reveal a dichotomy—whereas common ownership affects comove-
ment through price pressure, common short selling relates to comovement through informed
trading. This concurs with studies evidencing the role of short sellers for price discovery and
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liquidity provision (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013).
Finally, we contribute to a growing body of literature that makes use of short selling
disclosure data (Boehmer et al., 2018, Jones, Reed, and Waller, 2016, Jank, Roling, and
Smajlbegovic, Forthcoming). This data is partially censored, such that only large short
positions are observable. However, compared to previous short selling data, it comes with
the invaluable advantage of covering actual net short positions, submitted by short sellers
to the regulator.
Previous studies have used this data to analyse the behaviour of short sellers and the
relation between short positions and underlying stock returns. In contrast, we use this data
to study the relation between short selling and comovement. We connect stocks according to
common short sellers and show that these connections have informational value for predicting
comovement. This would not have been possible with traditional datasets on short interest
or securities lending proxying for short selling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the short selling
disclosure data and in Section III we outline the methodology used. In Section IV, we present
the results showing the predictive power of the number of common short sellers for forecasting
future excess correlation. In Section V, we investigate the two possible mechanisms that can
explain our results. In Section VI, we draw our conclusions.
II Data and Sample
According to EU regulation N. 236/2012, ratified in November 2012 by the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council, every financial subject detaining a net short position above
0.2% of shares outstanding of a company is required to disclose their position to the relevant
market authority—the FCA, in the UK. Furthermore, any short position that passes the
threshold of 0.5%, and every change by 0.1% after that, has to be disclosed publicly on the
FCA’s website. Public disclosures include the name and ISIN of the shorted share, the name
of the short seller, and the quantity short sold, in terms of percentage of shares outstanding.
In calculating their net short selling position, short sellers are required to include synthetic
short positions obtained through options.
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We collected all publicly disclosed short selling positions that were available on the FCA’s
website, between November 2012 and December 2019. Jones et al. (2016) study the effects
of the disclosure regulation for 12 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and find
that UK disclosures represent over half of their sample disclosures. Compared to short
interest data, short selling disclosures are actual net short positions obligatorily submitted
to the regulator and, therefore, are subject to attentive scrutiny.
The disclosures involve 657 unique stocks and 454 different short sellers. Most of the
stocks are of UK companies of all sectors. Table 1 shows the summary details for the
collected disclosure data.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the information given by public disclosures of short posi-
tions to the FCA. During the sample period, 60,099 disclosures were made, which included
8,026 position originations (i.e., the first disclosure of a net short position above 0.5% of the
shares outstanding), 44,493 updates (i.e., any increments or decrements of 0.1% of the shares
outstanding after the 0.5% threshold), and 7,580 position terminations (i.e., disclosures under
the 0.5% and representing the closing of the short position).
The number of disclosures increased steadily over the years of our sample, with the
exception of 2019.1 This may suggest that, over time, short sellers became more active
and/or that they became more accustomed to the new disclosure regulation.
Panel B of Table 1 presents additional descriptive statistics regarding the disclosure data.
The upper part of the panel shows that, on average, short sellers take position on about five
different stocks per year. The standard deviation is quite large, with some short sellers
taking position on as many as 116 different stocks over one year. The median holding period
length of a disclosed short position is of 28 trading days.
On average, the stocks of the disclosure data have around 3 short sellers per year taking
position on them. Although the standard deviation of short sellers per stock is not as large
as that of stocks per short seller, we observed that some stocks have as many as 29 different
short sellers taking position against them.
For all the stocks that had at least one disclosed short selling position, we searched for
1Note that we only observe data for the last two months of 2012.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics regarding disclosure data.
Panel A: Number of Disclosed Positions, Originations, Stocks, and Short Sellers
Year Disclosures Originations Stocks Short Sellers
2012 793 323 165 106
2013 4489 617 261 159
2014 5151 717 262 162
2015 7167 1008 279 185
2016 9301 1232 317 214
2017 10751 1384 321 224
2018 12557 1590 355 229
2019 9890 1155 357 203
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Stocks and Short Sellers
Variable Year Mean Med. S.D. Min Max
# of stocks per short seller 2012 2.9 1 5.6 1 53
2013 4 2 8.3 1 80
2014 4.7 2 8.6 1 75
2015 5.1 2 10 1 89
2016 5.3 2 11.7 1 116
2017 5.7 2 13 1 102
2018 6.5 2 14.4 1 113
2019 6.3 2 13.5 1 103
# of short sellers per stock 2012 1.8 1 1.7 1 12
2013 2.5 1 2.4 1 14
2014 2.9 2 2.7 1 15
2015 3.4 2 3.4 1 18
2016 3.6 2 3.7 1 23
2017 4 2 4.3 1 29
2018 4.2 2 4.6 1 26
2019 3.6 2 3.5 1 18
Panel A shows the number of disclosed position and the number of disclosures that were originations of a
short position. Panel B shows the summary statistics regarding the number stocks and short sellers involved
in the disclosure data.
historical price data and for company information using Refinitiv EIKON. We managed to
match the data for 470 stocks. For these stocks and for the time period covered, we also
searched for ownership data from Refinitiv Eikon and analyst earnings estimates from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). This data is used to build the controls for
5
Figure 1: Sample information by stock NACE Rev. 2 classification.
The chart shows the matched data sample by company classifier, following the Economic sector TRBC codes.
To be read against the left axis, the bars depict, for any given sector, the number of stocks in the sample
(full) and the number of short sellers taking position against those stocks (hatched). To be read against the
right axis, the lines depict the total number of disclosures (dashed) and the number of disclosures that were
originations (straight).
pairwise realised correlation.
To compute the variables in our model, we additionally required the stocks in our sample
to have a price for 50% of the trading days from Oct. 2007 to Dec. 2019. Moreover, we only
consider those stocks that were primary shares of companies traded on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE).
After these restrictions, and after dropping stocks not covered by ownership and analyst
estimates data, the final matched sample involves 358 stocks and 44,075 disclosed short
selling positions. Figure 1 summarizes the matched sample according to the Thompson
Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) economic sector code. The sector with the most
stocks was Industrials with 80 stocks, whereas the Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services
sector had the most disclosures and short sellers. As outlined in the next section, sector
information is used to control for similarities across stocks in our model.
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We present additional descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table A2 in the Internet Ap-
pendix.2 The average (median) market capitalisation of companies in our sample is about
$5.4 billion ($1.2 billion). For the purpose of comparison, the average market capitalisation
of companies listed on the LSE, at the end of 2018, was of $3.2 billion. We also note that the
stocks in our sample appear to have low analyst coverage—on average, every year, only 0.88
analysts issue a 1-year ahead earnings forecast. For a sample of stocks from the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ stock Market
(NASDAQ), Hameed, Morck, Shen, and Yeung (2015) report 4.60 analysts on average.
III Methodology
A The Model
We follow the approach proposed by Antón and Polk (2014), who studied the impact of
mutual fund holdings on the correlation of abnormal returns. Here, we are interested in the
effect of common short selling. We construct our main covariate, SSCAP , from the short
selling disclosure data described in Section II.
We define SSCAPij,t as the total value of stocks i and j, shorted by S common short









MV i,t +MV j,t
,
where W si,t is the value of the short position held by common short seller s against stock
i at the end of the quarter preceding month t and MV i,t is market value of stock i at the end
of the quarter preceding month t. The value of the short position, Wi,t, is computed using
the publicly disclosed short position weight, multiplied by the value of market capital of firm
i on the reported day of the position. If the short seller reported more than one disclosure
during the quarter, then we used the most recent disclosure.
Table 2 summarises the distribution of SSCAP . Median common short sold capital of
2Available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ftyywavevp5eh32/appendix.pdf?dl=0.
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Table 2: The Cross-Sectional Distribution of SSCAP
Percentiles
Year Mean Std 0 25 50 75 95 99 100
All 0.0003 0.0018 0 0 0 0 0 0.0086 0.0901
2013 0.0001 0.0011 0 0 0 0 0 0.0049 0.0475
2014 0.0001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0.0049 0.0455
2015 0.0001 0.0013 0 0 0 0 0 0.0061 0.0666
2016 0.0003 0.0018 0 0 0 0 0 0.0089 0.068
2017 0.0004 0.0024 0 0 0 0 0 0.0116 0.0812
2018 0.0005 0.0027 0 0 0 0 0.0045 0.0129 0.0901
2019 0.0005 0.0026 0 0 0 0 0.0047 0.0125 0.0679
This table reports the cross-sectional distribution of (scaled) common short sold capital. SSCAPij,t is the
total value of capital short sold by all common short sellers scaled by total market capitalisation, as of
quarter-end. The distributions of SSCAP is shown for the whole sample and for individual years of sample
coverage.
stock pairs is 0.18%, but can reach up to 9% of common capital. SSCAP is sparse as, over
any given quarter, short sellers tend to take few common positions across several stocks.
Nonetheless, as we will show in the next section, it contains explanatory power for future
excess correlation.
As can be noticed from Table 2, SSCAP increases over time. To make the cross-sections
comparable and ease interpretability of the regression coefficients, at each quarter, we nor-
malise SSCAP to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. We denote the normalised
variable SSCAP ∗.
We use SSCAP ∗ij,t to forecast the future within-month realised correlation (ρij,t+1) of each
stock pair’s daily six-factor excess returns. The six factors we consider are the market, size,
and value factors (Fama and French, 1993), momentum (Carhart, 1997), betting-against-
beta (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014), and quality-minus-junk (Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen,
2018).3 We include the latter two factors because recent studies have shown that they can
explain part of the performance of short sellers (Jank and Smajlbegovic, 2017).
In addition to these six factors, we also control for various pair characteristics, outlined in
the next subsection. All variables on the right-hand side of Equation 2 are updated quarterly,
meaning that variables relating to month t contain data ending at the end of the last quarter
3Daily factors and one-month Treasury bill rate are from AQR’s website
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preceding t.
(2) ρij,t+1 = a+ bs × SSCAP ∗ij,t +
n∑
k=1
bk × CONTROLij,k + ϵij,t+1
If the number of common short sellers shorting stocks i and j is associated with higher
future correlation in the excess returns of stocks i and j, then bs will be positive and signif-
icant.
To limit the effect of serial correlation, we estimate bs using the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions i.e., we run Equation 2 cross-sectionally for every t and compute the
temporal average of bs. Generally, we find that autocorrelation in our estimates is low and
limited to the first lag. We account for autocorrelation up to three lags (one quarter) with
Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors.
B Controls
In Equation 2, we include a large set of controls that could explain stock return correlations
beyond the six factors used to compute excess returns.
First, we control for common ownership of stock pairs. Let HCAPij,t be the total value
of i and j held by common owners, scaled by the market capitalization of the two stocks.
Ownership data is from Refinitiv EIKON. HCAP controls for excess correlation created by
common owners purchasing and selling stocks. By including HCAP in our specification, we
aim to separate the excess correlation due to short selling activity from long strategies of
investors.
We control for industry effects using the Thompson Reuters Business Classification
(TRBC).4 The TRBC consists of four levels of classification (Economic Sector, Business
Sector, Industry Group, and Industry). We created the variable NUMTRBCij,t, which
captures the number of consecutive equal level codes, starting from the most generic, in
the TRBC of stocks i and j. We also compute a series of additional size, style, and pair
characteristic controls.
4TRBC offers the widest coverage for the stocks in our sample. Results do not change with alternative
definitions of the industry control.
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In terms of size, we control for the size of the two companies i and j using their market
capitalisation. Chen, Chen, Chen, and Li (2017) show that stocks of similar size tend to be
more highly correlated. Hence, we captured differences in size using SAMESIZEij,t, which
we define as the negative absolute difference in the cross-sectional percentile ranking of the
market capitalization of i and j at the end of the quarter preceding period t. As size is a
proxy for the number of shares available to short sell (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan,
2001), it can also control for short selling costs. Thus, we included GAV SIZEij,t, which is
the geometric average of the cross-sectional percentile ranking of the market capitalization
of i and j at the end of the quarter preceding period t.
In terms of style, we control for similarities in the book-to-market ratio and the momen-
tum of the two stocks. We define SAMEBMij,t and SAMEMOMij,t as the negative absolute
difference in the cross-sectional percentile ranking of, respectively, the book-to-market ratio,
and the momentum of the two stocks.5
It is well known that book-to-market ratios are positively associated with future returns
(Stattman, 1980, Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985, Fama and French, 1992). Moreover,
Curtis and Fargher (2014) show that short sellers tend to concentrate on stocks with high
book-to-market. Hence, we include the geometric average (of the cross-sectional percentile
rank) of the book-to-market of the two stocks, GAV BMij,t. Furthermore, we include the
geometric average of the percentile rank of the momentum of the two stocks, GAVMOMij,t.
Short sellers might ride on declining prices, which are, by definition, correlated.
Finally, we control for a series of stock pair characteristics. To address concerns for
potential reverse causality in our regression model, we controlled for the past 2-year monthly
correlation of stock pairs, which we denote RETCORRij,t. We also control for the past 5-
year correlation of the return on equity for every pair, ROECORRij,t. Companies with
similar profits are expected to have correlated stock returns (Chen et al., 2017). We also
included a control variable capturing similarity in abnormal trading volumes of stock pairs,
V OLCORRij,t, which measures the monthly correlation in abnormal trading volumes over
the past two years.6
5Momentum is the cumulative stock return over the last year, excluding the most recent month.
6We compute abnormal trading volumes as the residual of the regression of volume on an annual trend
and monthly dummies.
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We control for the absolute difference in the price level of the two stocks, which we denote
DIFFPRICEij,t, as well as the absolute difference in their leverage, DIFFLEVij,t.
Following Antón and Polk (2014), we also build a control for the difference in sales growth.
However, because sales data is only available for half of our sample of stocks, we omit such
control from our main regressions. For the subsample for which data is available, we verify
that results are unchanged by including difference in sales growth in our model.
Lastly, we create variables to control for geographical location (Pirinsky and Wang,
2006). First, dummy variables DCOUNT and DCITY measure, respectively, whether two
companies had their headquarters in the same country and city. GEODIST measures the
geographical distance (in Kilometers) between the headquarters of two companies.
Past studies have reported that index membership effects correlation (see, Barberis et al.
(2005) and Greenwood (2007)). Since the stocks in our sample are all listed on the London
Stock Exchange, we check for their membership to the FTSE100. Throughout the sample
period, only one stock was member of the index. Therefore, we did not include controls for
index memebership of stock pairs.
With the exception of the dummy variables, we standardise all variables so that they
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. This is to ease interpretation of regression
coefficients. Moreover, apart for GEODIST and the dummies, we update all controls quar-
terly. We present summary statistics of the controls in Panel B of Table A2 of the Internet
Appendix.
IV Results
A Excess Stock Correlation with Common Short Selling
Table 3 shows the results of the Fama and MacBeth regressions using SSCAP ∗ to predict
the realised correlation of abnormal returns, as specified in Equation 2.
The first column of Table 3 describes the baseline specification using just SSCAP ∗ with
a constant. The coefficient on SSCAP ∗ is positive and significant, with a coefficient equal to
0.00303. Given that SSCAP ∗ is standardized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation,
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the constant term, which is 0.05351, reflects the average abnormal correlation between stock
returns, when SSCAP is at its mean. The coefficient on SSCAP ∗ can thus be interpreted
with respect to the average abnormal correlation. A standard deviation increase in the
common short sold capital is associated with an increase of the predicted excess return
correlation of about 5.7% of the average excess return correlation.
The second column of Table 3 shows results controlling for common ownership, similarity
in sector, size, book-to-market, and momentum. The coefficient on HCAP is positive and
highly significant. This result is consistent with common owners inducing higher correlation
through their trading of stocks held in common (Bartram et al., 2015).
Recall that the dependent variable is the correlation of the residuals of a six factor asset
pricing model, which includes the size, book-to-market, and momentum factor of Fama
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Despite this, similarity in size book-to-market,
and momentum still have a strong positive and significant association with future excess
correlation.
Consistent with early studies of Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993), the similarity in sector
of the two companies is a key determinant of correlation. The coefficient on NUMTRBC∗
is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.01277 and a t-statistic of 33.23.
In the second specification we also include the size control GAV SIZE∗, the geometric
average of the percentile ranking of the stock pair size. After adding these controls, the size
of the coefficient on SSCAP ∗ decreases, but remains significant at 10% confidence level with
a p-value of 5.8%.
In the third specification of Table 3, we add additional controls for pair characteristics.
The coefficient estimates for these variables are reported in the Internet Appendix. The terms
capturing similarities in past correlation, past profits, and past abnormal trading volume are
all positive and significant. The coefficient on DIFFLEV ∗ is positive and significant at
1%, meaning that stocks that have similar leverage have lower correlation of excess returns.
The coefficients on DIFFPRICE∗ is also positive, but insignificant. The coefficients on
the dummy variables DCOUNTRY is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level,
indicating that stocks of companies based in the same country are more strongly correlated.
Quite to the contrary, the coefficient on DCITY is negative and significant at the 5%
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Table 3: Common short selling and excess correlation
Dependent Variable: Correlation of 6F Residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.05351 0.05361 0.05072 0.05383(13.22) (13.28) (12.08) (13.3)
SSCAP ∗
0.00303 0.00074 0.00086 0.00125



















Other controls reported in the Internet Appendix
R2 0.05798 0.07386 0.07791 0.07906
(7.81) (8.97) (9.22) (9.21)
No. Obs. 63,415 59,177 50,899 50,583
(212.57) (124.87) (101.04) (100.82)
Size controls No Yes Yes Yes
Pair characteristic controls No No Yes Yes
Style controls No No No Yes
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression of the monthly realised correlation
of excess returns on common short sold capital and stock pair control variables. The dependent variable is the
realised correlation of a stock pair six-factor (Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014), Asness et al. (2018)) excess returns in month t+1. The independent variables are updated quarterly
and include SSCAP ∗, which is the (scaled) capital of the stock pair shorted by common short sellers.
HCAP ∗ is the (scaled) capital held by common owners. SAMESIZE∗, SAMEBM∗, and SAMEMOM∗
are the negative of the absolute difference in the cross-sectional percentile ranking of, respectively, size,
book-to-market, and momentum, for the stock pair. NUMTRBC∗ is the number of consecutively equal
digits in the TRBC code for the stock pair. GAV SIZE∗ is the geometric average of the cross-sectional
percentile ranking of size for the stock pair. Estimates for the remaining controls may be found in the
Internet Appendix. All independent variables (except the dummy variables) are normalised to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation. t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using Newey and West (1987)
robust standard errors, accounting for autocorrelation up to 3 lags (one quarter).
confidence level. With these additional controls the coefficient of SSCAP ∗ is significant at
the 5% level (t-statistic of 2.19, p-value of 3.2%).
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In the fourth column of Table 3, we add book-to-market and momentum measures for the
stock pairs, GAV EBM∗ and GAVMOM∗. Also, we replace both dummy variables with the
continuous variable GEODIST ∗. Again, coefficient estimates for these controls are given
in the Internet Appendix. In this specification, which is the most complete and flexible,
the coefficient on SSCAP ∗ gains in significance (t-statistic of 3.28 and p-value of 0.2%).
The coefficient equals 0.00125, which underlines that an increase in one standard deviation
in common short sold capital is associated with an increase of the predicted correlation of
excess returns of about 2.3% of the average abnormal correlation.
The coefficients reported in Table 3 show that the effect of a standard deviation increase
in common short selling is smaller than the effect of a standard deviation increase in common
ownership. To some extent, this difference reflects the fact that it is much easier to “go long”
than to “go short” and that long positions are generally much larger than short positions.
Consider interpreting results in terms of stock pair capital, using the standard deviation
of SSCAP given in Table 2. In the most complete specification, a 1% increase in common
short sold capital is associated with an increase of excess correlation of 0.00679, equivalent
to 12.6% of the average excess correlation. Taking into account the standard deviation of
HCAP given in Panel B of Table A4 of the Internet Appendix, a 1% increase in common
ownership is associated with an increase of excess correlation of 0.00028, that is 0.5% of its
average. Hence, if common short positions were as large as common long positions, they
would likely have a stronger association with correlation.
In untabulated results, we find that fitted values that are due to SSCAP ∗ range from an
average minimum of 0.0395 to an average maximum of 0.1039, around an average abnormal
correlation of 0.0538.7 As a mean for comparison, the fitted values due to HCAP ∗ range
from 0.0389 to 0.0753, showing that common short positions have similar explanatory power
to common long positions.
Overall, despite the high variability of the correlation of excess returns, which have an
average standard deviation of 0.24, in the fourth specification, the regression has an an
7To calculate the range of these fitted values, we first orthogonalise SSCAP ∗ with respect to all the
controls used in the fourth specification. We then forecast the realised correlation of 6-factor excess returns
using the orthogonalised SSCAP ∗ and save the minimum and maximum forecasted value for each cross-
section. Finally, we average these values across time.
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average R2 of 7.91% and the association between SSCAP ∗ and the future correlation of
excess returns is significant at 1% confidence level.
Notice that SSCAP ∗ explains excess returns of a six factor model, even after accounting
for many controls and characteristics. As explained in more detail in the next subsection,
the results of Table 3 are even stronger if we use excess returns from a four factor or one
factor model.
B Robustness
To check the robustness of our results, we carry out a series of alternative specifications of
the regressions given in Table 3.
First, we include the (standardised) number of common analysts, A∗, as an additional
control variable in our models.
Including A∗ in our regressions helps us control for factors that might contaminate the
effect of common short selling. According to Israelsen (2016), common analysts produce
correlated forecast errors that propagate to prices, leading to excess correlation.
We define Aij,t, equal to the number of analysts issuing an earnings forecast of both
stocks i and j over the past year. The distribution of A, presented in Panel C of Table A4 of
the Internet Appendix, shows that, especially for early cross-sections, our sample of stocks
has low (common) analyst coverage.8 For this reason, we run these additional robustness
regressions with A∗ for a subsample starting in July 2017.
We present results in Table A6 in the Internet Appendix. Although, across all speci-
fications, the coefficients on SSCAP ∗ are higher than for the full sample shown in Table
3, significance decreases for the second and third specification, (p-values of, respectively,
13.6% and 9.1%). Nonetheless, the estimate remains significant at the 5% level of confidence
(p-value of 1.6%) in the most complete specification.
The coefficient on common analyst coverage is also positive and highly significant. This
confirms the relation between common analyst coverage and excess correlation that has been
uncovered in several studies e.g., Antón and Polk (2014) and Israelsen (2016).
8For the more recent part of the sample, A appears to have a similar sparse distribution as SSCAP .
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As a second robustness check, we verify results with different specifications of the de-
pendent variable. First, to have a continuous dependent variable, we follow Pindyck and
Rotemberg (1993) and transform correlation to c = tan (πρ/2).
This transformation pushes high (absolute) correlation values towards minus/plus infin-
ity. However, the transformation is mild for values of correlation close to zero, which is our
case (see Figure A1 given in the Internet Appendix). For this reason, our results are basically
unchanged if we consider this continuous measure of excess correlation. Panel A of Table
A7 in the Internet Appendix reports the same regressions of Table 3 using as regressand the
continuous measure of excess correlation, c, instead of ρ.
We also verify whether the result holds for different specifications of excess return cor-
relation. Specifcally, we regress SSCAP ∗ and controls on the correlation of simple re-
turns (RET), the correlation of excess returns from the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), and the correlation of excess returns from the asset pricing model with Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors (FFC). Results are displayed in Panel B of Table
A7 in the Internet Appendix and show that, if anything, the association between SSCAP ∗
and correlation is stronger when we account for less factors, reinforcing the validity of results
in Table 3.
Lastly, we run the regressions in Table 3 using alternative and robust regressors. First, we
verify that replacing common short sold capital, SSCAP ∗, with the (standardised) number
of common short sellers, NSS∗, does not alter our main results (see Panel A of Table
A8 of the Internet Appendix). Second, we rerun all the regressions of Table 3 with rank-
transformed (and standardised) regressors. Although this decreases the significance of the
estimate on SSCAP , in the most complete specification, the estimate remains significant
at 1% confidence level. These results are available in Panel B of Table A8 in the Internet
Appendix.
V An Explanation
Different mechanisms can explain the positive relationship between common short selling
and future excess return correlation. In this section, we distinguish between two main
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mechanisms and we test their predictions.
A The Price Pressure Mechanism
To explain the excess comovement associated with common ownership, Antón and Polk
(2014) and Bartram et al. (2015) rely on the price pressure mechanism. According to Antón
and Polk (2014), mutual fund flows induce these funds to buy/sell stocks in their portfolios,
which leads to higher observed correlation of these stocks. On the other hand, according
to Bartram et al. (2015), it is active reallocations of funds, rather than flows, which drives
comovement.
A similar effect is foreseeable for common short sellers—by taking short positions against
several stocks, short sellers apply negative price pressure, inducing higher correlation.
Rather than applying negative price pressure and eroding liquidity, short sellers have
been found to help price discovery by acting as liquidity providers (Diether et al., 2009,
Boehmer and Wu, 2013). Nonetheless, short selling price pressure has been discussed in
several theoretical studies on liquidity crises.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) suggest that short sellers with predatory intentions
can cause contagion i.e., shifts in correlation (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Cont and Wagalath
(2013) argue that common short sellers can drive down prices of several stocks, inducing
high correlation. Both models predict that the effect of short selling on correlation inversely
depends on market depth of the stocks short sold—the more illiquid the stocks, the greater
should be the impact of common short sellers on correlation.
Note that the effect does not necessarily have to work in only one direction. Positive
price pressure might equally explain the relationship between common short selling and
excess comovement. In the event of a short squeeze, for example, short sellers would have to
buy stocks in order to cover their positions, driving up prices and correlation. To the extent
that a higher level of SSCAP is associated with a higher probability of future short squeeze,
the positive relationship between SSCAP and future excess correlation could also be due to
positive price pressure.
Therefore, we do not restrict our analysis to either negative or positive price pressure.
Rather, we test the prediction that the relation between SSCAP and excess comovement
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should be stronger for more illiquid stock pairs. Our goal is not to prove a causal relation,
which would be outside the scope of this paper, but to verify if the predictions of the price
pressure mechanism are consistent with our results for SSCAP .
We construct a dummy variable that captures the illiquidity of a stock pair. Specifically,
DAMIHUDij,t is equal to one if the Amihud measure for both stocks i and j is in the upper
cross-sectional quartile at quater-end t.9
We add the dummy variable and its interaction with SSCAP ∗ to the most flexible model
of our baseline regressions (corresponding to column 4 of Table 3).10 Results, reported in
the first column of Table 4, show that illiquidity is associated with lower future excess return
correlation, when controlling for size, style, and common characteristics.
Contrary to what is predicted by the asset class effect, the interaction term with SSCAP ∗
is negative and insignificant. The positive association between common short selling and
excess comovement appears weaker for more illiquid stocks. In fact, the total effect of
common short selling for illiquid stock pairs, is statistically insignificant.
This result is confirmed by further checks, using alternative measures of liquidity, based
on turnover and equity float.
We define turnover as volume traded as a percentage of shares outstanding. Then, the
dummy DTURN is equal to one if, over the prior quarter, both stocks have average daily
turnover below the lower cross-sectional quartile.
The second column of Table 4 shows that the interaction between SSCAP ∗ and the
turnover dummy is negative and significant at the 5% confidence level, indicating that the
effect of common short selling is less strong for the most illiquid stocks. Again, the total
effect of common short selling for illiquid stocks is statistically insignificant, meaning that
SSCAP ∗ has an effect only for liquid stock pairs.
Contrary to the results of Column 1, Column 2 shows that illiquidity, measured by
DTURN , is positively associated with future excess comovement. Both the Amihud measure





, where Dt is the number of trading
days in quarter t, | ri,td | is the absolute value of the daily return of stock i on day td, and Vi,td is the daily
dollar volume of shares traded.
10For the sake of brevity, the other specifications are omitted but give similar conclusions. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Common short selling and excess correlation: The effect of illiquidity
Dependent Variable: Correlation of 6F Residuals
(1) (2) (3)















SSCAP ∗ ×DFLOAT -0.00072(-1.46)
Other controls reported in the Internet Appendix




No. Obs. 50513 50513 50572(102.84) (102.84) (99.96)
Size controls Yes Yes Yes
Pair characteristic controls Yes Yes Yes
Style controls Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression of the monthly realized correlation
of excess returns on common short sold capital and stock pair control variables. The dependent variable
is the realized correlation of a stock pair 6-factor (Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014), Asness et al. (2018)) excess returns in month t + 1. The table shows the result of adding
illiquidity dummies DAMIHUD, DTRUN , DFLOAT and their interaction with SSCAP ∗ to the regression
carried out in Column 4 of Table 3. DAMIHUD is equal to one if both stocks in a stock pair have an
Amihud (2002) measure in the upper cross-sectional quartile during the previous quarter, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, DTRUN is equal to one if both stocks have an average daily turnover in the lower cross-sectional
quartile during the previous quarter. DFLOAT is equal to one if both stocks have percentage equity float
capital in the lower cross-sectional quartile during the previous quarter. Estimates for the remaining controls
may be found in the Internet Appendix. All independent variables are updated quarterly and normalised
to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using Newey and
West (1987) robust standard errors, accounting for autocorrelation up to 3 lag (one quarter).
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and turnover are built with the volume of shares traded over the previous quarter. However,
the former also takes into account price impact, by using the daily average absolute returns.
The discording results are puzzling, and have lead us to verify the results with a third
measure of liquidity, equity float.
We construct an additional dummy variable of illiquidity based on the percentage of
equity float of the stock pair. DFLOAT is equal to one if, for a stock pair, both stocks have
equity float in the lower cross-sectional quartile over the previous quarter.
The third column of Table 4 presents results using DFLOAT . Similar to the results using
DAMIHUD, Column 3 indicates that higher illiquidity is associated with lower levels of
excess comovement. The regression in Column 3 of Table 4 also shows that the coefficient on
interaction term with SSCAP ∗ is positive, although insignificant at the 10% confidence level.
This is consistent with previous results using Amihud and turnover as liquidity measures.
In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results using continuous liquidity
measures based on the Amihud indicator, turnover, and equity float of stock pairs. Overall,
these results point to a positive association between common short selling and excess return
comovent for liquid stocks. This effect weakens as stock pair illiquidity increases.
Overall, these results do not provide sufficient evidence to confirm that the positive
relationship between SSCAP and excess comovement is due to price pressure mechanism of
short selling.
If the price pressure mechanism does not explain the association between common short
selling and excess comovement, how do our results reconcile with the work of Antón and
Polk (2014) and Bartram et al. (2015)? One possibility is that the price pressure mecha-
nism underlines the relationship between common ownership and comovement, but not that
between common short selling and comovement.
This could occur if, for example, long sales (buys) drive prices more than short sales
(covers). Some evidence of this asymmetry has been provided by Shkilko et al. (2012). In
this case, price pressure remains a viable explanation for the relationship between common
ownership and excess comovement, but is insufficient to explain the relationship between




There is considerable evidence in the literature that short sellers are informed traders. For
example, Boehmer et al. (2008) and Diether et al. (2009) show that short sellers can correctly
predict future returns. Furthermore, studies have found short sellers to focus on overpriced
stocks, thus trading in a non-predatory fashion against market sentiment (Dechow et al.,
2001, Curtis and Fargher, 2014).
The association between common short selling and future correlation might be the prod-
uct of informed trading by short sellers. Short sellers trading according to information expect
stock prices to decline in the future. As these declines realise, they should lead to higher
observed correlation across the shorted stocks.
We verify this explanation by using additional data to isolate the effect highly informed
common short sellers on future excess return correlation.
We obtain the investor profiles for 323 out of the 454 short sellers in our data from
on Refinitiv EIKON. From these profiles, we collect the following information: investment
orientation, investor type, portfolio turnover (%), and number of instruments held.11
First, we explore the differential impact of SSCAP for hedge funds.12 Hedge funds are
considered highly informed agents (Aragon and Martin, 2012, Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and
Yang, 2013). For this reason, we would expect common short sellers that are hedge funds to
be more informed than short sellers that are not hedge funds.
We classify short sellers in our sample as hedge funds if, according to their Refeni-
tiv EIKON investor profile, their investor type is either “Hedge Fund” or “Investor Advi-
sor/Hedge Fund”. According to this classification system, our sample comprises 234 short
sellers as hedge fund and 89 as non-hedge funds. Figure 2 depicts the classification of the
short sellers in our sample according to their location.
Further, we double check that this hedge fund classification is consistent with others
employed in the literature. In particular, using the SEC ADV forms filed by the short sellers
in our sample, we obtain consistent classifications following the methodology of Brunnermeier
11Investor profiles are not available historically, so they refer to the date of collection (March 2020).
12We do not explicitly make the distinction between hedge funds and hedge fund managers. Simply, we
refer to both types of entities as hedge funds.
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Figure 2: Sample of Short Sellers
The charts show the number of short sellers identified as hedge funds or hedge fund managers (hatched/grey)
and their country of location (solid/bold). Short sellers located in Switzerland were grouped within the
”Other EEA” category, whereas the “Other non-EEA” category contains short sellers from Australia, Canada,
and Hong Kong. The category ”Tax Havens” groups short sellers located in tax haven countries, as defined
by the OECD (2000).
and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009).
Table 5 presents the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of excess return
correlation on SSCAP for different types of common short sellers. Results are shown for the
fourth and most complete specification of Table 3. Alternative specifications present similar
results and are available upon request.
The first column of Table 5 shows the effect of SSCAP for short sellers that classify as
hedge funds and non-hedge funds. The regression coefficient on SSCAP for hedge funds is
larger than that on non-hedge funds, and this difference is statistically significant at the 10%
significance level (p-value at 8%).
We obtain similar results when we distinguish short sellers based on their investment
orientation. Refinitiv EIKON classifies investors’ investment orientation as either active
or passive. Active investors are more prone to stock-picking and using proprietary trading
strategies, whereas passive investors involves less buying and selling and more long-haul in-
vestments. Our sample of short sellers includes 276 active investors and 47 passive investors.
Results, reported in the second column of Table 5, show that common short positions
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Table 5: Common short selling and excess correlation by entity type
Dependent Variable: Correlation of 6F Residuals











Other controls reported in the Internet Appendix
Difference between groups 0.00067 0.00078 0.00092(1.77) (1.78) (2.25)
R2
0.07909 0.07909 0.07908 0.07919
(9.22) (9.22) (9.22) (9.22)
No. Obs. 50,583 50,583 50,583 50,583(100.82) (100.82) (100.82) (100.82)
Size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair characteristic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression of the monthly realized correlation
of abnormal returns on common short sold capital and stock pair control variables. The dependent variable
is the realized correlation of a stock pair 6-factor (Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014), Asness et al. (2018)) abnormal returns in month t + 1. Each row reports the coefficient
on SSCAP ∗, the (scaled) capital of the stock pair shorted by common short sellers, computed for different
types of short sellers. Estimates for the remaining controls may be found in the Internet Appendix. All
independent variables are updated quarterly and normalised to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.
t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors, accounting
for autocorrelation up to 3 lags (one quarter).
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of active investors are more strongly associated with future excess correlation than those
of passive investors. As active investing requires processing extensive information rapidly,
these results are in line with the informed trading explanation.
Next, we explore whether the association between common short selling and excess return
correlation varies with the location of short sellers. We determine the location of the short
sellers according to their country of incorporation, given by Refinitiv EIKON. If the country
of incorporation is unavailable, we use the short sellers’ country of headquarters. In turn,
if the country of headquarters is unavailable, we use the country of principle business, as
reported in the short sellers’ ADV form.
Figure 2 shows that the short sellers are mainly located in the United States and United
Kingdom. About 27.9% of the short sellers in our sample are domiciled in countries consid-
ered as tax haven by the OECD (2000).
The third column of Table 5 shows the differential effect of common short selling for
entities located in tax havens. Compared to short sellers located in non-tax haven countries,
short sellers located in tax haven countries tend to be more opaque (Jank et al., Forthcom-
ing). The coefficient attached to common short selling is weaker for sellers that are located
in tax haven countries than for those located in non-tax haven countries. The difference
with is significant at 1%. Our results suggest that common short sellers located in tax
haven countries take less informative positions in terms of predicting future excess return
correlation.
In untabulated results, we have also verified whether the effect of SSCAP was different
for short sellers located in the United States compared to the effect for short sellers located
in the United Kingdom. Although, the coefficient on SSCAP for US short sellers was larger
than that of UK short sellers, this difference was not statistically significant.
In the fourth column of Table 5, we present the effect of SSCAP for common short
sellers with different levels of portfolio turnover and portfolio concentration.
We define a short seller as a high (low) turnover short seller if it ranks in the upper
(lower) cross-sectional tercile in terms of portfolio turnover. Similarly, we define high (low)
concentration short sellers those short sellers that rank in the lower (upper) cross-sectional
tercile in terms of number of stocks dealt.
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The fourth column of Table 5 shows that the relationship between common short selling
and future excess return correlation is stronger for short sellers that are high turnover and
low concentration investors. These type of agents are likely to be highly informed, as they
often re-balance their portfolios and invest in few specific stocks.
Overall, our results show that common short selling is predictive of future excess corre-
lation especially when the common short sellers are informed agents, such as active hedge-
funds, with high turnover and low concentration.
VI Conclusion
Our results have two main implications.
First, stocks with higher common short sellers are more correlated than stocks without
common short sellers. For investors, this means that accounting for common short sellers
provides diversification benefits. Accordingly, our new approach to interpreting publicly
available data on short selling disclosures offers a useful tool to portfolio and risk managers.
Second, our analysis using illiquidity measures and short seller types shows that the
association between common short selling and excess comovement can be primarily ascribed
to the informed trading of short sellers rather than price pressure. For financial stability
policy, this offers additional evidence that short sellers are informed agents, unlikely to act
predatorily and trigger contagion.
Short selling disclosure data allows us to connect stocks according to their common short
sellers. However, the European legislation sets the disclosure threshold at 0.5% of company
capital, which means that we cannot observe potentially smaller common short positions
that might have additional explanatory power for excess return comovement.
According to Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), large
positions are more likely to be informed than small positions. This is in line with our
result that common short selling relates to excess comovement through the informed trading.
Future work could verify whether our conclusions continue to hold for smaller short positions,
which are, as by EU Regulation N. 236/2012, exclusively disclosed to national regulators.
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